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Abstract
The growth of health care costs remains a serious concern in the United States. Slowing this growth
involves understanding what drives health care costs and how to target those drivers effectively. In this
brief, we review the relative importance of different health care cost drivers, including insurance benefits
design, price inflation, provider incentives, technological growth, and inefficient system performance. We
analyze the impact of these factors on the growth of health care spending in the last decade, which has
been concentrated in hospitals and felt most acutely in the private market. We find that unit prices and
technology remain the most important cost drivers of this recent growth. In reviewing public and private
payer initiatives that target health care costs, we find that some have yielded modest results, but the
evidence on most strategies is inconclusive or mixed. Designing and implementing effective interventions
to slow cost growth remains a challenge, particularly in the privately insured market, where premiums
have risen considerably in the last decade.
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The growth of health care costs
remains a serious concern in the United
States. Slowing this growth involves
understanding what drives health care
costs and how to target those drivers
effectively. In this brief, we review the
relative importance of different health
care cost drivers, including insurance
benefits design, price inflation, provider
incentives, technological growth, and
inefficient system performance. We
analyze the impact of these factors on
the growth of health care spending in the
last decade, which has been concentrated
in hospitals and felt most acutely in
the private market. We find that unit
prices and technology remain the most
important cost drivers of this recent
growth. In reviewing public and private
payer initiatives that target health care
costs, we find that some have yielded
modest results, but the evidence on
most strategies is inconclusive or mixed.
Designing and implementing effective
interventions to slow cost growth remains
a challenge, particularly in the privately
insured market, where premiums have
risen considerably in the last decade.
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Table 1. Estimated contributions of specific factors to health care cost
growth (CBO), 1940-1990

Health care costs in the United States, and their rate of
growth, remain a serious concern for payers and policymakers.
Sustainable levels of spending depend on slowing the rate
of growth. And slowing the rate of growth requires effective
policies that target drivers most amenable to change.
In this brief, we summarize the literature on the drivers of health
care cost increases. We consider the relative importance of
insurance design, unit prices, provider incentives and delivery
system performance, and technological growth. We review
the evidence to date on how public and private payers can
affect these drivers to slow the rate of cost growth.
We then ground this evidence in the national context of how
the financing of health care has shifted over the last decade,
including a greater role for public payers and the increasing share
of spending devoted to hospitals. The data come mainly from
the federal National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA),
which provides a detailed picture of health care costs, and an
overview of the flow of money through the health system.

DRIVER

ESTIMATED
CONTRIBUTION TO
SPENDING GROWTH

Aging of the population

2%

Changes in third-party payment

10-13%

Personal income growth*

5-23%

Unit prices

11-22%

Administrative costs

3-13%

Defensive medicine and
supplier-induced demand**

0%

Technology-related changes

38-65%

* Health care is a “normal” economic good, so as income grows people spend more
on health care. At the national level, there is a linear correlation between per capita
GDP and percent of GDP spent on health care.

WHAT DRIVES HEALTH CARE
SPENDING GROWTH?

** Defensive medicine refers to services with little or no clinical value that clinicians
order to avoid lawsuits. Supplier-induced demand refers to physicians increasing
service volume to offset lost revenue from fee reductions.

At a basic level, increases in health care spending occur because of
some combination of changes in prices, utilization, and the severity
of patient case mix (e.g., demographic changes). Within these broad
conceptual categories, specific drivers play different roles in increasing
health care spending, depending on the period studied and the
framework used.

Figure 1. Factors associated with health care expenditure growth

For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) identified
eight historical drivers of rising health care costs from 1940-1990,
and estimated their relative contribution (Table 1).1 All growth that
could not be attributed to the observable factors were attributed to
technology. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that “the most
important factor driving the long-term growth of health care costs
has been the emergence, adoption, and widespread diffusion of new
medical technologies and services by the U.S. health care system.”

FACTORS
Population size
Population age
Disease prevalence
or incidence
Service utilization
Service price
and intensity
Total Change
-100

The importance of technology was underscored in a 2017 study
that used a different framework to quantify drivers of cost growth
nationally between 1996 and 2013. The study counted technology
as a subcategory of service price and intensity and found that more
than 50% of all spending growth could be attributed to that category
(Figure 1). Changes in utilization and disease prevalence were not
significant factors.2
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Strategies to control consumer-driven overutilization

To estimate the drivers of more recent health care spending, the

FACTORS
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the

5%
Increasingly,
private insurers have turned to higher deductibles (Figure
Population
size used a model that considers the contribution of price growth,
Actuary
3) as a way to counteract excessive utilization that generous insurance
4%
changes
Population
age in the age and sex composition of the population, and
might induce. Deductibles and co-payments are highly effective
residual use and intensity (i.e., utilization not attributable to the other
at reducing utilization. A recent study found that when employers
Disease prevalence
3%
or two
incidence
factors). According to CMS, demographic factors remain steady
switched to high-deductible health plans, overall health care spending
Service from
utilization
year to year, but the contribution of price growth and residual
declined
11.7%-13.8%, and consumers reduce their spending by 42%
2%
use/intensity
of services varies by year (Figure 2). For example, in 2015
Service
price
when under a deductible. However, the study found that consumers
andresidual
intensity use drove most of the 5.0% increase in per capita spending, in
cut1%high value and low value care in equal proportion, indicating
Totalthe
Change
wake of Affordable Care Act (ACA) coverage gains. In contrast,
that increased cost sharing is an effective but blunt instrument for
in 2018 about over half of the 4.0% increase in per capita spending
controlling the growth of health care costs.6
-100 0
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Figure 2. Factors associated with health care cost growth (CMS)
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Figure 3. Rates of deductibles in the employer-based market, 2006
and 2017 (AHRQ)
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10%
Percentage of private sector
employees with a deductible
■ 2006

Share of workers with
deductible over $1,000
■ 2017

100%

Which of these factors are
sensitive to policy changes by public and
87.5%
private payers, and which policies have been successful in curbing cost
growth? In the following review, we disaggregate specific drivers and
66.4%
60%
discuss the effectiveness of different approaches that target them.
51%

Additionally, employers can shift to managed care plans, such as
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) arrangements, in which
patients must go through a primary care “gatekeeper” to gain access
to costly specialist services. In the 1980s, managed care plans rose in
popularity in the private market, and in 1993 over 70% of Americans
with health insurance were in a managed plan.7 The managed care
backlash in the late 1990s is associated with a rapid rise in health care
spending.8

80%

40%

DRIVERS:
Consumer demand
20%
People who are insulated from the full cost of
their care tend to
10%
0% more health care services than they otherwise would. From the
use
Percentage of private sector
Share of workers with
RAND health
insurance
experiment in thedeductible
1960s toover
the$1,000
more recent
employees
with a deductible
Oregon Health Insurance experiment, many studies demonstrate
■ 2006
■ 2017
that generous coverage of health care services produces greater use
(including some overuse) of health care services by consumers.4,5

Does managed care limit cost growth? Several factors complicate
assessing the effectiveness of managed care. First, managed care
describes a heterogeneous set of plan types. Second, managed care
plans tend to attract healthier populations, so they benefit from a
selection bias. Despite the healthier population, literature reviews
of managed care in the private market and within Medicare (i.e.,
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Strategies to control provider-induced demand and improve
delivery system performance

Medicare Advantage) suggest that charges in HMO plans are 10-15%
lower than non-HMO plans, and a greater penetration of gatekeeperbased plans can slow spending growth overall.7,9

To change the incentives inherent in fee-for-service payment, the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) authorized market-based reforms to
shift financial risk for total cost of care to providers, with payments tied
to improved quality or reduced net cost. So far, payment reforms such
as bundled payments and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)
have yielded very modest spending reductions for certain procedures
and types of patients.

Most states have shifted their Medicaid beneficiaries to private,
capitated managed care plans over the last decade. From 2007 to
2016, the share of Medicaid enrollees in managed care rose from 64%
to 81%.10 A 2012 analysis from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
found that savings from transitioning Medicaid beneficiaries to
managed care plans are modest at best, with a wide variation.11

Bundled payments put providers at financial risk for the total cost
of care for an episode of care, such as hip or knee replacements.
Providers are penalized for going over a benchmark price, and share
in the savings for coming under the target. Bundled payments have
modestly reduced per-episode costs for many surgical procedures.
Evaluations of voluntary and mandatory programs for hip and knee
replacements have found per-episode savings between 1.6% and
3.9%.17-19 However, for medical conditions such as heart attacks or
pneumonia, evaluations have shown no per-episode or overall savings
for Medicare to date.

DRIVERS:
Over-utilization (provider focused) and delivery
system performance (inefficiency)
Under-performing and fragmented health care delivery systems may
also drive up costs. Under fee-for-service conditions, providers—
including physicians and hospitals—have incentives to overuse
medical services and lack financial motivation to deliver coordinated,
operationally efficient care. Health care waste includes the use of
unnecessary services—the use of services beyond evidence-based
benchmarks—as well as inefficiently delivered services that result from
fragmentated or poorly coordinated systems. A 2019 literature review
found that unnecessary utilization, reliance on low-value services,
and excess cost due to uncoordinated or inefficiently delivered care
account for between $205 and $344 billion in annual excess spending.
Once adding in pricing failures, fraud, and administrative complexity,
the study found that a quarter of all health care spending ($760 to
$935 billion) could be classified as wasteful.12

Fewer studies have assessed the impact of bundled payments in
commercial insurance. However, a recent study of a multi-payer
program in Arkansas found that mandatory bundled payment
arrangements for perinatal care yielded a 3.8% relative decrease in
per-episode costs.20
While bundled payments target specific episodes of care, ACOs
are networks of physicians, hospitals, and other providers that are
responsible for the total cost of care for a specified population, i.e.,
population health. The largest program, the Medicare Shared Savings
Program (MSSP) has more than 500 participating ACOs that cover
over 11 million lives.21 ACOs earn shared savings if they come in under
a benchmark annual growth rate of roughly 2%. In 2010, the CBO
estimated that ACOs would save a net of $1.7 billion for the federal
government between 2013 and 2016, but a recent analysis suggests
that after making shared savings payments and considering program
cost, the MSSP ACOs have a net cost of $384 million in that time.22
Other analysts argue that ACO performance builds over time, and
generated savings of over $300 million in 2017.23 Regardless of the
debate on estimated impact, it is clear that any benefit for cost growth
is small in magnitude.

There are several hypotheses for why providers may recommend
unnecessary or inefficient services, based on providers trying to
maintain a level of income or having a tendency to recommend
services with mixed evidence.13 Although the reasons are complex, it
is clear that providers can and do induce unecessary utilization and
often fail to deliver well-coordinated care, both of which drive up
costs.
As early as 1978, economists observed that all else equal, increases in
surgeons per capita increased use of surgical services.14 More recently,
studies of geographic variation in health care spending among
Medicare beneficiaries demonstrated wide variation in spending that
is unexplained by health status, geography, or prices.15 A National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on
geographic spending also concluded that provider decision making
was the primary cause of excessive spending, without any relationship
to quality or access to services.16

Within commercial insurance, the effectiveness of ACO contracts
has not been well-studied. However, the Massachusetts Alternative
Quality Contract (AQC) yields some insight. The Massachusetts
AQC is a population-based payment model in Blue Cross Blue
Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts, that includes both financial risks
and rewards for providers. A recent evaluation found that over
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eight years, the AQC resulted in 11.7% relative savings on enrollee
claims, with no change in quality.24 Furthermore, in Hawaii, the Hawaii
Medical Service Association (HMSA) recently introduced the
Population-based Payments for Primary Care (3PC) program. 3PC
is a population-based payment system that replaces fee-for-service
primary care payments with risk-adjusted per-member per-month
(PMPM) fees and offers primary care providers shared savings based
on risk-adjusted member spending. A recent 1-year evaluation found
that 3PC was successful in improving quality and changing practice
patterns (e.g., intended modest reductions in primary care visits),
which may be harbingers of future savings, though there were no
differences in total cost of care in the year 1 evaluation.25

IssueBRIEF

consider clinical and cost effectiveness when issuing guidance
regarding which services should be included in Australian Medicare or
the British National Health Service.
The US lacks centralized HTAs.31 Instead, individual insurers and
public payers make coverage decisions on an ad hoc basis.32-34 The
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI), established
under the ACA, funds comparative effectiveness studies, but does
not make coverage decisions.35 To date, while there are anecdotes
of insurers or pharmacy benefit managers restricting access to new
treatments, the effects of these decisions on cost growth is unknown.36
Given the tendency to cover new treatments, one common strategy
to control utilization is prior authorization (PA), in which a provider
must request approval from a health plan before delivering a service.
PA requirements have become increasingly commonplace in the
case of very costly new drugs. For example, a 2018 study found
that more than 80% of patients across all insurance sectors had a
PA requirement for PCSK9 inhibitors, a new treatment for patients
with familial hypercholesterolemia or atherosclerotic cardiovascular
disease.37

Vermont is experimenting with an all-payer ACO model that began
in 2017. Although enrollment is voluntary, the state has stated its
goals of having 70% of all insured residents and 90% of its Medicare
beneficiaries in ACOs by 2022. Per capita spending growth in the
ACO is limited to 3.5%, with Medicare spending growth limited to 0.10.2% below national Medicare growth.26 Robust data from Vermont’s
all-payer ACO model will not be available for several years, as the
performance period ends at the end of 2022.

PA requirements raise concerns over patient access and physician
autonomy, but evidence suggests they may reduce utilization of
some low-value services. From 2012 through 2017, CMS initiated
four PA demonstration projects and one permanent PA program.
The demonstrations were targeted to services deemed to be at high
risk for improper use, such as including mobility devices (e.g., power
wheelchairs), and non-emergency hyperbaric oxygen therapy. A
GAO analysis of these programs found these projects significantly
reduced Medicare expenditures and, if expanded, would yield
between $1.1 and $1.9 billion in annual savings.38 Within the private
commercial space, a recent study found that prior authorization
of costly drugs or drugs with high abuse potential can reduce the
targeted use of the targeted drug by half.39 However, American
Medical Association surveys show that the vast majority of physicians
believe that prior authorization has negative effects on patient clinical
outcomes and imposes significant, unreimbursed costs on practices.40
Reducing the administrative burden and cost of PA programs should
be a primary concern.

DRIVERS:
Technology
New medical interventions, surgeries, imaging services, drugs, and
diagnostic tools expand the scope of health care and often command
a higher unit price. When health care services improve or extend
life, they may be of social value, even when they increase spending.27
When new technologies can alleviate health conditions, one-time
increases in spending may yield lower long-term spending.28
However, policymakers and the public are questioning the costeffectiveness of many new technologies, both in terms of the prices
commanded and the outcomes achieved. For example, the extent to
which new oncology drugs offer meaningful improvements in overall
survival and quality of life is hotly debated,29 as evidence mounts that
patients are paying more per year of life gained than ever before.30

Strategies to control technology-related spending growth

Public and private payers have little sway over which drugs and
technologies are brought to market, but they do have specific tools
to limit improper use of new technologies First, payers can refuse
to cover new tests, drugs, and treatments. Many countries with
single-payer style health care systems utilize Health Technology
Assessments (HTAs) to weigh the value of new treatments and
inform decisions about whether or not to cover them. For example,
the Australian Medicare Services Advisory Committee (MSAC)
and UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)

Recently, commercial insurers have begun to experiment with two
methods to manage the use of drugs: formulary tiering and reference
pricing. Formulary tiering involves the categorization of drugs as
“preferred” or “non-preferred,” based on evidence of efficacy, cost, or
a combination of the two. The structure of formulary tiering programs
can vary, but in general they reduce or eliminate co-pays for preferred
medications and, in some cases, increase co-pays for non-preferred
drugs. In theory, tiered formularies direct patients to lower-cost,
clinically equivalent therapies.

5
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The literature regarding formulary tiering is varied, and most studies
use medication adherence as the primary outcome of interest.41,42
One large study of a value-based formulary in the pacific northwest
suggests that tiering can reduce both drug-related and overall
expenditures. In 2010, Premera Blue Cross implemented a formulary
benefit design for employees that used cost-effectiveness analysis
to determine copayments. An evaluation of the program found that
medication expenditures fell 10% compared to a control group, with
no effects on overall utilization or non-medication expenditures.43
Other evaluations of tiered formularies show more mixed results.
A 2014 study of a value-based insurance design (VBID) in Blue
Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina found that reducing co-pays
for branded medications and eliminating all cost-sharing for generics
resulted in improved medication adherence and reductions in
nonmedication expenditures, but those savings were swamped by
increases in medication expenditures.44 The evidence suggests that
value-based formularies, when structured correctly and paired with
disease management programs, may improve medication adherence,
but only have marginal impacts on cost.45
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physicians.49 There is strong evidence that mergers increase prices
for services,50 and a recent analysis of private health insurance claims
found that inpatient hospital prices grew 42% from 2007 to 2014, while
physician prices for inpatient care grew 18%.51
In addition to horizontal integration through mergers, hospitals have
also accelerated their purchasing of physician practices—with the
proportion of physician practices owned by hospitals doubling from
2002 through 2008 and continuing over the last decade, partially
in response to the expansion of value-based payment policies.52,53
Although vertical integration of physician practices and hospitals
offers the promise of greater efficiencies in the delivery of valuebased care, evidence suggests that it has led to price increases,54
rather than quality improvements.55 Most recently, a 2018 study found
that from 2007 to 2013, prices for services provided by acquired
physicians rose by an average of 14.1% after acquisition, and most of
the pricing increase was attributable to the increased use of pricing
rules that favor hospitals.53
Strategies to control unit prices
Facing consolidated markets in which a single hospital system may be
the only provider available, commercial insurers have less leverage to
negotiate lower unit prices. Without state interventions, commercial
insurers generally control price inflation by increasing leverage in
negotiations with providers. Historically, these strategies have included
HMOs, tiered networks, and, increasingly, narrow networks, in which
providers accept lower reimbursements in exchange for being
included in a plan’s limited network. Recent work suggests that narrow
network plans on the health insurance marketplaces have 16% cheaper
premiums, suggesting a pricing discount.56

In contrast, reference pricing classifies individual drugs based on
therapeutic class, and payment rates are pegged to the price of one
of the cheapest (or average of) drugs in that class—with consumers
making up the difference. While reference pricing is commonly
employed abroad, it has only recently gained attention in the US.
To date, the evidence of how effective reference pricing is remains
weak. One study of a reference pricing initiative in a large self-insured
plan found that limiting payment to the price of the least-costly drug
in each therapeutic category (unless a physician exemption was
made) resulted in a 7% higher share of prescriptions being filled with
the lowest-cost drug relative to a control group, and the average
price paid per prescription declined 13.9%, generating savings of
$1.34 million for the employer over 18 months. Importantly, patient
copayments did increase as well, by $0.12 million (30.9% on average).46

Across all health care services, the US has higher unit prices than
comparable countries. Further, within the US, the private sector pays
far higher prices than the public sector, a differential that has increased
substantially in the past 15 years.47 A recent literature review found that,
on average, employer-based plans pay hospitals double the Medicare
rate for inpatient services and triple the rate for outpatient services.48

Commercial insurers have also experimented with reference pricing
for specific services, in which payers set a maximum payment rate for
a service. These initiatives tend to focus on narrow bands of services,
such as outpatient procedures (e.g., joint replacements) or tests (e.g.,
lab services) with the intention of changing consumer choices in
the short term and, in the long term, encouraging price competition
by suppliers. To date, most publicly available data of the effects
of reference pricing come from the California Public Employees
Retirement System (CalPERS) and Safeway, which instituted
reference pricing systems for many outpatient procedures, diagnostic
tests, and laboratory services. A recent literature review found that
rates of patients selecting below-reference price services increased
from 8.6% to 18.6% depending on the service, and the average price
reduction for most services clustered between 17% and 21%.57

Hospital consolidation is driving price growth. A 2017 study found
that from 2010 to 2016 hospital markets became increasingly
consolidated, with over 90% of metropolitan statistical areas having
highly concentrated hospital markets, compared to 65% for specialist

In a few states, lawmakers have acted to target unit prices with all-payer
rate setting and reference pricing initiatives that limit legally allowed
provider charges. Maryland has controlled hospital prices with all-payer
rate setting since the 1970s. In 2014, CMS and Maryland transitioned

DRIVERS:
Unit prices

6
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all hospitals to global budgets with specific benchmarks to keep overall
health care spending at or below state GDP growth. By the end of
2016, the new model had generated $586 million in Medicare savings
from reduced hospital spending growth, exceeding the 2018 target
of $330 million. Maryland has achieved an annual hospital spending
growth of 1.53% per capita, beating the 3.58% target rate. In 2018, the
state received approval to expand its global budgets beyond hospitals
to include some outpatient care.58 Similarly, Montana and California
have instituted reference price systems that limit the prices of certain
hospital services to a specific multiple of Medicare rates.59,60 The
evidence of these statewide reference pricing initiatives is unavailable.

IssueBRIEF

These aggregate data tell us little about the value of health care
spending, in terms of outcomes and alternative uses for these
funds. On the one hand, health care spending can grow because of
expanding access to care, or because new, effective treatments come
to market. On the other hand, spending can grow because prices for
the same services increase without delivering better outcomes.

SHIFTING PAYER LANDSCAPE
Public payers have taken on a larger role in financing health care over
the last decade. Private sources accounted for 55.2% of all spending in
2018, down from 58.7% in 2008. At the same time, the share of public
spending increased from 41.3% to 44.8%.

In 2010, Rhode Island’s Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner
implemented a set of “affordability standards” in an effort to control
growth in the commercial insurance market. The standards included
price controls that capped annual increases for inpatient and
outpatient charges at medical inflation plus 1%. A recent analysis of
commercial claims in Rhode Island from 2007-2016 suggests that perenrollee spending growth was 4.8% lower in commercial fee-for-service
contracts, and 2.7% lower overall, than similar adults in other states.61

Pubic spending is growing in its share of total spend due to population
aging into Medicare and the expansion of Medicaid. From 2008 to
2018, Medicare enrollment grew by 32.2% and Medicaid enrollment
grew by 54.2%. In contrast to Medicare and Medicaid, overall private
health care spending has risen substantially despite enrollment
increasing by only 1.8%, with a net decline in employer-sponsored
insurance enrollment from 177.3 million to 175.2 million (Figure 6).

DRIVERS IN CONTEXT:
How much does the United States spend, and how
fast is spending increasing?

Public payers tend to cover individuals with greater health care needs,
such as the elderly and disabled, so per-enrollee spending was much
higher in Medicare ($12,784) and Medicaid ($8,201) than in employersponsored insurance ($6,103) in 2018. However, since 2008, total
per enrollee spending growth was highest in employer-sponsored
insurance (46.4%), followed by Medicare (21.5%), and Medicaid
(12.5%). Therefore, while public spending has increased as a share of
national health care expenditures as a result of rising enrollment, the
8%
private market is experiencing greater per-enrollee cost growth.
7%

The growth of national health care spending has slowed over the past
decade, compared to the 2001-2007 period (Figure 4). Per capita
spending increased from $7,890 in 2008 to $11,172 in 2018. Health care
spending as a share of GDP grew moderately between 2008 and
2016 (from 16.3% to 17.9%) but has generally stabilized (Figures 4 and
5). These overall numbers, as well as the analysis to follow, are drawn
from the CMS National Health Expenditure Accounts.
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Cost growth in the private market is reflected in substantial
premium increases. The Kaiser Family Foundation’s Employer
Health Benefits Survey indicates that from 2008-2018, the
average family premium for employer-sponsored insurance
increased from $12,680 to $19,616, and premiums for individual
coverage increased from $4,704 to $6,896 (46.6%). 62
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From 2008 to 2018, hospitals have grown as the major center
of health care costs. On a per capita basis, hospital spending
increased from $2,389 to $3,649 (52.7%), or an average of
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services grew at an average rate of 3.4% from $2,137 to
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The growth of hospital spending has been particularly acute for private insurers. From
2008 to 2018, per capita private health insurance spending in hospitals grew by 78.4%, an
average rate of 6.0% per year (from $1,345 to $2,340). As a result, hospital spending grew
its share of total private health insurance spending, from 33.1% to 38.7%.
In contrast, per capita spending on physician and clinical services increased by an
average rate of 3.3% per year, (36.5% total), from $1,139 to $1,555. Similarly, on a per
capita basis, spending on prescription drugs grew by 2.2% per year, from $546 to $670
per person. As a result, both professional services and prescription drugs fell as a share
of private health insurance expenditures.
While other classes of spending are small components of commercial health spending, it
is important to note that several smaller categories have experienced rapid growth over
the last decade. In particular, per capita private health insurance spending on nursing
care/retirement facilities and home health care grew at average annual rates of 6.3% and
7.9%, respectively, although they remain a very low share of total private spending (less
than 2%).

CONCLUSION
This review of the drivers of health care costs—and the strategies put in place to slow
them—demonstrates the relative contribution of unit prices, utilization, and technology
on rising health care spending. While the overall growth of health care costs has slowed
in recent years, much of the success has been attributable to Medicare and Medicaid
initiatives to control price. Commercial insurers, without the leverage of the state
or federal government, still face the challenge of unrelenting growth in per-enrollee
spending, particularly in the hospital sector.
Historically, commercial insurers have sought to control health care costs with initiatives
directed at consumers. These include increasing deductibles and designing benefits to
induce cost-conscious shopping behavior among consumers. While there is evidence
that some of these consumer-directed initiatives reduce expenditures, they are blunt
instruments that tend to cut low- and high-value care in equal proportion.
More importantly, focusing on consumer behavior may begin to yield diminishing
returns. Over the last decade, when it comes to spending in the private sector, sustained
price hikes and provider practice patterns appear to be the most important drivers
of health care spending. In particular, as hospitals continue to consolidate through
horizontal integration and the purchase of ancillary outpatient clinics, prices paid for
both inpatient and outpatient hospital services have grown substantially faster than for
physician services.
So far, efforts that focus on supplier-based overprovision of services, such as
Accountable Care Organizations and bundled payments, have yielded modest savings.
Some states and regulators have had more success with global budgeting and rate
setting for hospital services. For commercial insurers specifically, however, no single
strategy emerges as the best way to change provider behavior or control price growth.
Rather, cost control in the private sector relies on iteration and experimentation, and
must contend with the larger market forces that exert upward pressure on per-unit
prices, especially in the hospital sector.

9

IssueBRIEF

ABOUT LDI
Since 1967, the University of
Pennsylvania’s Leonard Davis
Institute of Health Economics
(Penn LDI) has been the leading
university institute dedicated to
data-driven, policy-focused research
that improves our nation’s health
and health care. Penn LDI works
on issues concerning care for
vulnerable populations; coverage
and access to health care; improving
care for older adults; and the opioid
epidemic. Penn LDI connects
all twelve of Penn’s schools, the
University of Pennsylvania Health
System, and the Children’s Hospital
of Philadelphia through its more
than 300 Senior Fellows.
This Issue Brief is supported by the
Hawaii Medical Service Association
(HMSA), a nonprofit, independent
licensee of the Blue Cross Blue
Shield Association in Hawaii, and
the Department of Medical Ethics
and Health Policy at the University
of Pennsylvania.

COLONIAL PENN CENTER
3641 LOCUST WALK
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104-6218
LDI.UPENN.EDU
P: 215-898-5611
F: 215-898-0229
@PENNLDI

AUTHORS
Aaron Glickman, MPA
Policy Analyst
Leonard Davis Institute of
Health Economics
University of Pennsylvania
Janet Weiner, PhD, MPH
Co-Director for Health Policy
Leonard Davis Institute of
Health Economics
University of Pennsylvania

LDI

IssueBRIEF

REFERENCES
1. 	Orszag, P. R. (2008). Growth in Health Care Costs. Washington D.C. Retrieved from https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/01-31-healthtestimony.pdf
2.	Dieleman, J. L., Squires, E., Bui, A. L., Campbell, M., Chapin, A., Hamavid, H., … Murray, C. J. L. (2017). Factors Associated With Increases in US Health Care Spending, 1996-2013.
JAMA, 318(17), 1668-1678. doi:10.1001/jama.2017.15927
3.	Hartman, M., Martin, A. B., Benson, J., & Catlin, A. (2019). National Health Care Spending In 2018: Growth Driven By Accelerations In Medicare And Private Insurance Spending.
Health Aff (Millwood), 39(1), 8-17. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2019.01451
4.	Brook, R. H., Keeler, E.B., Lohr, K. N., Newhouse, J. P., Ware J. E., Rogers, W. H., … Reboussin, D. (2006). The Health Insurance Experiment: A Classic RAND Study Speaks to the Current
Health Care Reform Debate. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9174.html
5.	Baicker, K., Taubman, S. L., Allen, H. L., Bernstein, M., Gruber, J. H., Newhouse, J. P., … Finkelstein, A. N. (2013). The Oregon Experiment — Effects of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes.
New England Journal of Medicine, 368(18), 1713-1722. doi:10.1056/NEJMsa1212321
6.	Brot-Goldberg, Z. C., Chandra, A., Handel, B. R., & Kolstad, J. T. (2017). What does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending
Dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(3), 1261-1318. doi:10.1093/qje/qjx013
7.	Glied, S. (2000). Chapter 13 – Managed Care. In A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics (Vol. 1, pp. 707-753): Elsevier.
8.	Chen, A., & Goldman, D. (2016). Health Care Spending: Historical Trends and New Directions. Annual Review of Economics, 8(1), 291-319. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015317
9.	Chernew, M., Decicca, P., & Town, R. (2008). Managed care and medical expenditures of Medicare beneficiaries. J Health Econ, 27(6), 1451-1461. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.07.014
10.	
Medicaid Managed Care: Trends and Snapshots, 2000 – 2013. Retrieved from https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/data-and-systems/medicaidmanaged-care/downloads/2013-medicaid-managed-care-trends-and-snapshots-2000-2013.pdf
11.	Sparaer, M. (2012). Medicaid managed care: Costs, access, and quality of care. Retrieved from https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2012/09/medicaid-managed-care.html
12.	Shrank, W. H., Rogstad, T. L., & Parekh, N. (2019). Waste in the US Health Care System: Estimated Costs and Potential for Savings. JAMA, 322(15), 1501-1509. doi:10.1001/
jama.2019.13978
13.	Berwick, D. M. (2019). Elusive Waste: The Fermi Paradox in US Health Care. JAMA, 322(15), 1458-1459. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.14610
14.	Fuchs, V. R. (1978). The Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations. The Journal of Human Resources, 13, 35-56. doi:10.2307/145247
15.	Newhouse, J. P., & Garber, A. M. (2013). Geographic Variation in Medicare Services. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(16), 1465-1468. doi:10.1056/NEJMp1302981
16.	Variation in Health Care Spending: Target Decision Making, Not Geography. (2013). In J. P. Newhouse, A. M. Garber, R. P. Graham, M. A. McCoy, M. Mancher, & A. Kibria (Eds.).
Washington (DC).
17.	Barnett, M. L., Wilcock, A., McWilliams, J. M., Epstein, A. M., Joynt Maddox, K. E., Orav, E. J., … Mehrotra, A. (2019). Two-Year Evaluation of Mandatory Bundled Payments for Joint
Replacement. New England Journal of Medicine, 380(3), 252-262. doi:10.1056/NEJMsa1809010
18.	Navathe, A. S., Emanuel, E. J., Venkataramani, A. S., Huang, Q., Gupta, A., Dinh, C. T., … Liao, J. M. (2020). Spending And Quality After Three Years Of Medicare’s Voluntary Bundled
Payment For Joint Replacement Surgery. Health Aff (Millwood), 39(1), 58-66. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00466
19.	Dummit, L. A., Kahvecioglu, D., Marrufo, G., Rajkumar, R., Marshall, J., Tan, E., … Conway, P. H. (2016). Association Between Hospital Participation in a Medicare Bundled Payment
Initiative and Payments and Quality Outcomes for Lower Extremity Joint Replacement Episodes. JAMA, 316(12), 1267-1278. doi:10.1001/jama.2016.12717
20.	Carroll, C., Chernew, M., Fendrick, A. M., Thompson, J., & Rose, S. (2018). Effects of episode-based payment on health care spending and utilization: Evidence from perinatal care in
Arkansas. J Health Econ, 61, 47-62. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.06.010
21.	
Shared Savings Program Fast Facts – As of January 1, 2020. (2020). Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/files/document/2020-shared-savings-program-fast-facts.pdf
22.	Seidman, J., Feore, J., Rosacker, N. (2018). Medicare ACOs Have Increased Federal Spending Contrary to Projections That They Would Produce Net Savings [Press release]. Retrieved
from https://avalere.com/press-releases/medicare-accountable-care-organizations-have-increased-federal-spending-contrary-to-projections-that-they-would-produce-net-savings
23.	Mechanic, R., Gaus, C. (2018). Medicare Shared Savings Program Produces Substantial Savings: New Policies Should Promote ACO Growth. Retrieved from https://www.healthaffairs.
org/do/10.1377/hblog20180906.711463/full/
24.	Song, Z., Ji, Y., Safran, D. G., & Chernew, M. E. (2019). Health Care Spending, Utilization, and Quality 8 Years into Global Payment. N Engl J Med, 381(3), 252-263. doi:10.1056/
NEJMsa1813621
25.	Navathe, A. S., Emanuel, E. J., Bond, A., Linn, K., Caldarella, K., Troxel, A., … Volpp, K. G. (2019). Association Between the Implementation of a Population-Based Primary Care Payment
System and Achievement on Quality Measures in Hawaii. JAMA, 322(1), 57-68. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.8113
26.	
Vermont All-Payer ACO Model. (2016). Retrieved from https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/vermont-all-payer-aco-model/
27.	Cutler, D. M., & McClellan, M. (2001). Is technological change in medicine worth it? Health Aff (Millwood), 20(5), 11-29. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.20.5.11
28.	Skinner, J. S., Staiger, D. O., & Fisher, E. S. (2006). Is technological change in medicine always worth it? The case of acute myocardial infarction. Health Aff (Millwood), 25(2), w34-47.
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.25.w34
29.	Mailankody, S., & Prasad, V. (2015). Five Years of Cancer Drug Approvals: Innovation, Efficacy, and Costs. JAMA Oncol, 1(4), 539-540. doi:10.1001/jamaoncol.2015.0373
30.	Howard, D. H., Bach, P. B., Berndt, E. R., & Conti, R. M. (2015). Pricing in the Market for Anticancer Drugs. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(1), 139-162. doi:10.1257/jep.29.1.139
31.	Timmins, N. (2016). How To Think About Health Technology Assessment: A Response To Goldman And Coauthors. Retrieved from https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20160915.056524/full/
32.	Cisneros, R., Arthurs, S., & Hiatt, J. C. (2016). Medical Technology Assessment at Kaiser Permanente: History and Description of Approach (USA). In L. Sampietro-Colom & J. Martin
(Eds.), Hospital-Based Health Technology Assessment: The Next Frontier for Health Technology Assessment (pp. 227-238). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

10

LDI

IssueBRIEF

33.	Health Technology Assessment. Retrieved from https://www.hca.wa.gov/about-hca/health-technology-assessment
34.	Meyer, H. (2009). Insurers Apply Different Methods In Making Coverage Decisions. Retrieved from https://khn.org/news/compare-sidebar/
35.	Fisher, K., McKinney Jr., Ross (2020). More medical research = better patient care. Retrieved from Washington D.C.: https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/more-medical-research-betterpatient-care
36.	Cunningham, C. (2018). Column: Why are so many more medications not covered by insurance? Chicago Tribune. Retrieved from https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/ct-ahpcolumn-help-squad-tl-0329-story.html
37.	Doshi, J. A., Puckett, J. T., Parmacek, M. S., & Rader, D. J. (2018). Prior Authorization Requirements for Proprotein Convertase Subtilisin/Kexin Type 9 Inhibitors Across US Private and
Public Payers. Circ Cardiovasc Qual Outcomes, 11(1), e003939. doi:10.1161/circoutcomes.117.003939
38.	Clowers, A. N., & King, K. M. (2018). Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate: CMS Should Take Actions to Continue Prior Authorization Efforts to Reduce Spending. Retrieved
from https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691381.pdf
39.	Dillender, M. (2018). What happens when the insurer can say no? Assessing prior authorization as a tool to prevent high-risk prescriptions and to lower costs. Journal of Public Economics,
165, 170-200. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.006
40.	2017 AMA Prior Authorization Physician Survey. [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/arc/prior-auth-2017.pdf
41.	Maciejewski, M. L., Farley, J. F., Parker, J., & Wansink, D., (2010). Copayment Reductions Generate Greater Medication Adherence In Targeted Patients. Health Aff (Millwood), 29(11),
2002-2008. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0571
42.	Chernew, M. E., Shah, M. R., Wegh, A., Rosenberg, S. N., Juster, I. A., Rosen, A. B., ... Fendrick, A. M. (2008). Impact Of Decreasing Copayments On Medication Adherence Within A
Disease Management Environment. Health Aff (Millwood), 27(1), 103-112. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.27.1.103
43.	Yeung, K., Basu, A., Hansen, R. N., Watkins, J. B., & Sullivan, S. D. (2017). Impact of a Value-based Formulary on Medication Utilization, Health Services Utilization, and Expenditures.
Med Care, 55(2), 191-198. doi:10.1097/mlr.0000000000000630
44.	Maciejewski, M.L., Wansink, D., Lindquist, J. H., Parker, J. C., & Farley, J. F. (2014). Value-Based Insurance Design Program In North Carolina Increased Medication Adherence But Was
Not Cost Neutral. Health Aff (Millwood), 33(2), 300-308. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2013.0260
45.	Chernew, M. E., Juster, I. A., Shah, M., Wegh, A., Rosenberg, S., Rosen, A.B., … Fendrick, A. M. (2010). Evidence That Value-Based Insurance Can Be Effective. Health Aff (Millwood),
29(3), 530-536. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0119
46.	Robinson, J. C., Whaley, C. M., & Brown, T. T. (2017). Association of Reference Pricing with Drug Selection and Spending. N Engl J Med, 377(7), 658-665. doi:10.1056/NEJMsa1700087
47.	Anderson, G. F., Hussey, P., & Petrosyan, V. (2019). It’s Still The Prices, Stupid: Why The US Spends So Much On Health Care, And A Tribute To Uwe Reinhardt. Health Aff (Millwood),
38(1), 87-95. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05144
48.	Koller, C. F., & Khullar, D. (2019). The Commercial Differential for Hospital Prices: Responses From States and Employers. JAMA, 322(8), 723-724. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.9275
49.	Fulton, B. D. (2017). Health Care Market Concentration Trends In The United States: Evidence And Policy Responses. Health Aff (Millwood), 36(9), 1530-1538. doi:10.1377/
hlthaff.2017.0556
50.	Antwi, Y. A., Gaynor, M., Vogt, W. B. (2009). A Bargain at Twice the Price? California Hospital Prices in the New Millennium. Forum for Health Economics & Policy. doi:10.3386/w15134
51.	Cooper, Z., Craig, S., Gaynor, M., Harish, N. J., Krumholz, H. J., & Reenen, J. (2019). Hospital Prices Grew Substantially Faster Than Physician Prices For Hospital-Based Care In 2007–14.
Health Aff (Millwood), 38(2), 184-189. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05424
52.	Kocher, R., & Sahni, N. R. (2011). Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians — The Logic behind a Money-Losing Proposition. New England Journal of Medicine, 364(19), 1790-1793.
doi:10.1056/NEJMp1101959
53.	Capps, C., Dranove, D., & Ody, C. (2018). The effect of hospital acquisitions of physician practices on prices and spending. Journal of Health Economics, 59, 139-152. doi:10.1016/j.
jhealeco.2018.04.001
54.	Baker, L. C., Bundorf, M. K., Kessler, D. P. (2014). Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership Of Physician Practices Is Associated With Higher Prices And Spending. Health Aff (Millwood),
33(5), 756-763. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2013.1279
55.	Scott, K. W., Orav, E. J., Cutler, D. M., & Jha, A. K. (2017). Changes in Hospital-Physician Affiliations in U.S. Hospitals and Their Effect on Quality of Care. Ann Intern Med, 166(1), 1-8.
doi:10.7326/M16-0125
56.	Dafny, L. S., Hendel, I., Marone, V., & Ody, C. (2017). Narrow Networks On The Health Insurance Marketplaces: Prevalence, Pricing, And The Cost Of Network Breadth. Health Aff
(Millwood), 36(9), 1606-1614. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1669
57.	Robinson, J. C., Brown, T. T., & Whaley, C. (2017). Reference Pricing Changes The ‘Choice Architecture’ Of Health Care For Consumers. Health Aff (Millwood), 36(3), 524-530.
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1256
58.	Huelskoetter, T. (2018). Evaluating State Innovations to Reduce Health Care Costs. Retrieved from https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2018/04/06/448912/
evaluating-state-innovations-reduce-health-care-costs/
59.	Livingston, S. (2019). Montana’s experiment in reference-based pricing has saved $13.6M so far. Modern Healthcare. Retrieved from https://www.modernhealthcare.com/insurance/
montanas-experiment-reference-based-pricing-has-saved-136m-so-far
60.	Frakt, A. (2016). How Common Procedures Became 20 Percent Cheaper for Many Californians. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/upshot/how-commonprocedures-got-20-percent-cheaper-for-many-californians.html
61.	Baum, A., Song, S., Landon, B. E., Phillips, R. S. Bitton, A., & Basu, S. (2019). Health Care Spending Slowed After Rhode Island Applied Affordability Standards To Commercial Insurers.
Health Aff (Millwood), 38(2), 237-245. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05164
62.	Claxton, G., Rae, M., Long, M., Damico, A., & Whitmore, H. (2018). Health Benefits In 2018: Modest Growth In Premiums, Higher Worker Contributions At Firms With More Low-Wage
Workers. Health Aff (Millwood), 37(11), 1892-1900. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2018.1001

11

